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Abstract
Global health research is essentially a normative undertaking: we use it to propose policies that ought to be implemented. 
To arrive at a normative conclusion in a logical way requires at least one normative premise, one that cannot be derived 
from empirical evidence alone. But there is no widely accepted normative premise for global health, and the actors with 
the power to set policies may use a different normative premise than the scholars that propose policies – which may 
explain the ‘implementation gap’ in global health. If global health scholars shy away from the normative debate – because 
it requires normative premises that cannot be derived from empirical evidence alone – they not only mislead each other, 
they also prevent and stymie debate on the role of the powerhouses of global health, their normative premises, and the 
rights and wrongs of these premises. The humanities and social sciences are better equipped – and less reluctant – to 
approach the normative debate in a scientifically valid manner, and ought to be better integrated in the interdisciplinary 
research that global health research is, or should be.
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Introduction
Several papers exploring the role of politics and power in 
global health have been published in this young journal 
recently1-13; which suggests that a new journal may have been 
needed to allow for this important discussion. In my opinion, 
this debate is vital for global health science – and I mean 
vital: I do not think the academic arm of global health can 
‘survive’ in any meaningful way without addressing the role 
of norms, politics and power in global health head on. But I 
know that my position makes many of my colleagues nervous. 
As I will explain further below, it is not possible to discuss 
the politics of global health without discussing the normative 
premises behind the politics, and normative premises cannot 
be logically derived from empirical evidence alone. But if we 
step away from the purely empirical evidence-based approach 
to global health,14 will we not inevitably return to a form of 
global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and the 
concerns of organized interest groups?”15 In my opinion, 
this is a false dilemma, as a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach to global health research is a fiction and thus aiming 
for it makes little sense. Worse, by denying that researchers, 
like all humans, have personal opinions, such an approach 
drives researchers’ personal opinion underground, turning 
global health science into unconscious dogmatism or stealth 
advocacy, avoiding the crucial debate about the politics and 
underlying normative premises of global health.
Global Health Research Is Essentially Normative, but 
Lacks a Widely Accepted Normative Premise
Whatever definition of global health one uses, it always 
contains a normative element. To Koplan and colleagues,16 
global health means “an area for study, research, and practice 
that places a priority on improving health and achieving 
equity in health for all people worldwide.” For Beaglehole 
and Bonita,17 global health is “collaborative trans-national 
research and action for promoting health for all.” Kickbush18 
defines global health as “those health issues that transcend 
national boundaries and governments and call for actions on 
the global forces that determine the health of people.” Global 
health’s agents ought to improve health, ought to achieve equity 
in health, ought to promote health, or are called to take action. 
Who are global health’s agents? Why should they do anything 
about global health? And why does it matter?
Normative conclusions can be derived from premises in 
a logically sound way, but they always require at least one 
normative premise – one that cannot be logically derived 
from empirical evidence alone. For example:
·	 If it is true (and empirically proven) that skilled birth 
attendance reduces maternal mortality
·	 And, if it is true that the international community 
ought to make all reasonable efforts to reduce maternal 
mortality worldwide
·	 Then it is logically true that the international community 
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ought to make all reasonable efforts to increase skilled 
birth attendance worldwide.
This is a logically valid argument. The conclusion, however, 
requires both premises. And while the first premise can be 
empirically proven, the second cannot. If someone tells me 
that the international community has no responsibility 
whatsoever to reduce maternal mortality worldwide – and 
that only national governments have such a responsibility – I 
can argue that such a normative premise is contradictory to 
the millennium development goals (MDGs), contradictory to 
international human rights law, or contradictory to my own 
or someone else’s ethical standards, but I will never be able to 
prove empirically that the premise is false. 
Then why would someone, or some institution, take action to 
improve people’s health in a foreign country? Many answers 
are possible. Out of compassion, perhaps – witnessing the 
plight of people living in less fortunate countries, people or 
institutions from more fortunate countries feel compelled 
to act. Enlightened self-interest is another possible answer. 
Watching epidemics unfold in other parts of the world, some 
people, or institutions, feel they should intervene to protect 
their interests. Justice – or, more narrowly, human rights – 
could be another reason: people or institutions feel or accept 
they have a legal obligation to realize a minimum level of 
the right to health abroad. One can probably think of other 
reasons for health agency abroad, but these three alternatives 
suffice to make my point. What matters is:
·	 Each of these 3 normative premises may lead to different 
policy options.
·	 None of these 3 normative premises can be empirically 
proven.
·	 None of these 3 normative premises has gathered 
sufficiently wide consensus to allow us to ignore the 
alternatives.
Allow me to use a concrete global health recommendation to 
illustrate my point. Denny and Emanuel19 argue that “[t]he 
allocation of international health aid should be guided by 3 
fundamental principles: (1) to save the most lives; (2) to save 
young lives in particular; and (3) to do so using finite resources 
most effectively”, and therefore, they argue, that increasing 
international health aid spending on AIDS treatment “means 
that health needs unrelated to HIV/AIDS will remain unmet.” 
There is obviously something missing in this argument. Even 
if AIDS treatment indeed costs “between $350 to $2010 per 
disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) averted,” as Denny and 
Emanuel argue, it does not necessarily mean that other health 
needs will remain unmet. If, and only if, there is not enough 
money to address all health needs that are equally or more 
cost-effectively addressed, then, providing AIDS treatment 
means that cheaper-to-address health needs will remain 
unmet. Implicitly, Denny and Emanuel19 argue that there is 
not enough money to provide AIDS treatment and all equally 
or more cost-effective interventions. (Explicitly, they only 
argue that “[i]nternational aid is inherently limited,” but there 
is a crucial difference between accepting that international 
health aid is limited and accepting that international health 
aid is limited at a point below the level required to include 
AIDS treatment.) Returning to the normative premises above:
·	 If international health aid were based on the right to 
health, then it ought to be sufficient to help finance all 
essential healthcare, including AIDS treatment.
·	 If international health aid were based on enlightened self-
interest, then it should indeed be used chiefly to control 
infectious diseases (and include AIDS treatment).
·	 If international health aid were based on charity, then it 
should take into account the particular sensitivities of the 
‘donors’ and their constituencies (and, again, probably 
include AIDS treatment).
It therefore appears as if Denny and Emanuel are applying a 
normative premise that is a mixture of international health 
aid as charity and public health utilitarianism; namely 
wealthier countries are free to decide how much aid they 
give, but whatever they give should be used to save as many 
lives as possible. AIDS advocates will take issue with this 
normative premise: they will argue that wealthier countries 
should give enough aid to avoid having to make the choice 
Denny and Emanuel propose. And, the American Congress 
may take issue with this normative premise, but in a different 
way: it may believe that saving American lives – through 
infectious disease control – is more important than saving 
non-Americans lives. Thus, the choice of normative premise 
will result in different policy preferences, even if the empirical 
evidence were unequivocal. 
Thus, a substantial part of the “implementation gap between 
knowledge and action” in global health,20 could be explained 
by differences in normative premises, rather than differences 
related to the empirical evidence. The people producing 
the knowledge are using different normative premises than 
the people with the power to steer the response. If we do 
not include the normative differences in the debate, we will 
continue to run around in circles, wondering why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars. 
Stealth Advocacy and Unconscious Dogmatism
As mentioned above, many global health scholars are 
reluctant to engage in the normative debate because it reeks 
of advocacy. Further, it requires taking positions that cannot 
be empirically proven, and that may take us down the path 
to policy recommendations “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,”15 the path we are 
trying to move away from. 
To be clear, I do not agree that advocacy is problematic. By 
advocacy, I mean “the act or process of supporting a cause 
or proposal,” as defined by the Merriam-Webster online 
dictionary. I find it rather difficult to imagine meaningful 
global health research that is not supporting a cause or 
proposal – global health is a cause. I do have problems with 
stealth advocacy, and by stealth advocacy I mean advocacy 
disguised as the outcome of a logical process that relied 
entirely on empirical evidence, and thus fails to acknowledge 
the underlying normative premise. Stealth advocacy is 
problematic for 5 key reasons. First, it is misleading, as it 
inevitably includes a normative premise somewhere, but that 
normative premise is probably buried under thick layers of 
empirical evidence. Second, it makes debate with scholars 
who use a different normative premise impossible. Third, it 
may lead to unrealistic policy proposals, because the policy-
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makers’ normative premise may differ from that of the 
researcher. Fourth, by implying that empirical evidence is all 
that matters, it fails to ‘speak to power’ and thus covers up 
the role of politics and power in global health. And that leads 
to the most problematic consequence of stealth advocacy: the 
role of the powerhouses of global health remains unchallenged 
because the true scope of their influence is downplayed or 
ignored.
Some global health scholars do not practice stealth advocacy 
when they propose policy without highlighting their 
normative premise: they simply assume that their own 
normative premise is self-evident, and shared by all involved 
in the debate. Again, let me clarify that I do not think that 
dogmatism is always problematic. Dogmatic, according to 
the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, means “expressing 
personal opinions or beliefs as if they are certainly correct and 
cannot be doubted.” Dogmatism can be very useful: if we had 
to start every paper by explaining that we believe surviving 
is better than dying, and that living a life with dignity is 
better than merely surviving, our papers would become very 
long and boring. So, there are personal opinions or beliefs 
that cannot be empirically proven, but that are nonetheless 
sufficiently widely shared to allow us to use them implicitly. 
But dogmatism based on opinions that are not unanimous 
(or almost unanimous) creates confusion. For example, if one 
scholar challenges the abolition of user fees for health services 
in low-income countries as unsustainable, using domestic 
financial self-reliance as the main criterion for sustainability, 
based on his or her personal opinion that countries ought 
to be financially self-sufficient, while another scholar 
understands sustainability as a capacity to endure over time, 
in combination with a personal opinion that open-ended 
international co-financing is entirely appropriate, they will 
never reach a form of understanding, unless they are willing 
to understand and acknowledge that their normative premise’s 
differ. Like stealth advocacy, unconscious dogmatism covers 
up the role of politics and power in global health. 
Growing Pains
Can we avoid the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ – the stealth advocacy 
and the unconscious dogmatism – of global health? Not if 
we fail to acknowledge that a purely empirical evidence-
based approach is a fiction. Using Lee’s words, as long as 
global health scholars perceive the exercise of power and its 
underlying normative premises “in disparaging terms as a 
factor to be minimized or excluded,”10 they will continue to 
practice stealth advocacy or unconscious dogmatism. The 
first prerequisite for moving away from these practices is 
to acknowledge that no meaningful statement about health 
action abroad can be made without at least one normative 
premise – one that cannot be logically derived from empirical 
evidence alone, and one for which, at present, there is no 
broad consensus. The second prerequisite is to acknowledge 
that the humanities and social sciences, like international 
law, ethics, philosophy, and political science, are probably 
better equipped to study, analyze and discuss normative 
premises than biomedical sciences – and that a permanent 
and deeper interdisciplinary dialogue is needed.21 The third 
prerequisite is to value equally the input of  biomedical and 
humanities and social science research, while understanding 
their different roles and limitations. Even if the law and social 
sciences may produce knowledge that is more influenced 
by (acknowledged) personal opinion and that is less readily 
replicated than the knowledge produced by biomedical 
sciences,22 the humanities and social sciences produce the 
best available answers to many questions that are essential for 
global health. 
According to Grépin,13 “global health is usually more inclusive 
of social sciences than public health or international health; it 
is more multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary in nature.” 
She may be right, but only in a relative, ‘glass half full’ sense: 
as long as the biomedical approach dominates the scholarly 
global health scene,10 global health’s unproductive growing 
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